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Theory of Cooperative Games

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Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games - Game Theory - Mathematical Journals, Books & Online Media Springer.cdmm 
 
outline 
Theory of Cooperative Games
  TU Games
  Dynamic Bargaining Procedures for the Kernel and the Bargaining Set
  Continuity Properties of Solutions
  The Shapley Value
  Geometric Properties of the e-Core, Kernel, and Prekernel
  The Prenucleolus
  The Prekernel, Kernel, and Nucleolus
  Bargaining Sets
  The Core
  Coalitional TU Games and Solutions
  NTU Games
  Variants of the Davis-Maschler Bargaining Set for NTU Games
  On the Classical and the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set
  The Consistent Shapley Value
  The Shapley NTU Value and the Harsanyi Solution
  The Core of NTU Games
  Cooperative Games in Strategic and Coalitional Form
  Axiomatizations
  Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility
  Nash's Program
 Bezalel Peleg, Peter Sudholter
 >>New Map
 Theory of Cooperative Games
 
 TU Games
 
 The Prenucleolus
  A Combinatorial Characterization of the Prenucleolus
  Preliminary Results
  An Axiomatization of the Prenucleolus
  An Axiomatization of the Nucleolus
  The Positive Core
  The Prenucleolus of Games with Coalition Structures
  The Nucleolus of Strong Weighted Majority Games
  The Modiclus
  Constant-Sum Games
  Convex Games
  Weighted Majority Games
 Bezalel Peleg, Peter Sudholter
 >>New Map
 Theory of Cooperative Games
 
 TU Games
 
 The Core
  The Bondareva-Shapley Theorem
  An Application to Market Games
  Totally Balanced Games.
  Some Families of Totally Balanced Games
  Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games
  Permutation Games
  A Characterization of Convex Games
  An Axiomatization of the Core
  An Axiomatization of the Core on Market Games
  The Core for Games with Various Coalition Structures
 Bezalel Peleg, Peter Sudholter
 >>New Map
 Theory of Cooperative Games
 
 TU Games
 
 Bargaining Sets
  The Bargaining Set M
  Existence of the Bargaining Set
  Balanced Superadditive Games and the Bargaining Set
  Further Bargaining Sets
  The Reactive and the Semi-reactive Bargaining Set
  The Mas-Colell Bargaining Set
  Non-monotonicity of Bargaining Sets
  The Bargaining Set and Syndication
 Bezalel Peleg, Peter Sudholter
 >>New Map
 Theory of Cooperative Games
 
 TU Games
 
 The Shapley Value
  Existence and Uniqueness of the Value
  Monotonicity Properties of Solutions and the Value
  Consistency
  The Potential of the Shapley Value
  A Reduced Game for the Shapley Value
  The Shapley Value for Simple Games
  Games with Coalition Structures
  Games with A Priori Unions
  Multilinear Extensions of Games
 Bezalel Peleg, Peter Sudholter
 >>New Map
 Theory of Cooperative Games
 
 NTU Games
 
 The Core of NTU Games
  Balanced NTU Games
  Ordinal and Cardinal Convex Games.
  Ordinal Convex Games.
  Cardinal Convex Games
  Individual Rationality, Pareto Optimality, and the Core
  An Axiomatization of the Core
  Reduced Games of NTU Games
  Axioms for the Core
  Additional Properties and Characterizations
 Bezalel Peleg, Peter Sudholter
 >>New Map
 Theory of Cooperative Games
 
 NTU Games
 
 On the Classical Bargaining Set and the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set
  Preliminaries
  The Bargaining Set M
  The Mas-Colell Bargaining Set MB and Majority Voting Games
  The 3x3 Voting Paradox
  Classical Bargaining Set for NTU Games
  Mas-Colell
  Voting Games with an Empty Mas-Colell Bargaining Set
  Non-levelled NTU Games with an Empty Mas-Colell Prebargaining Set
  The Example
  Non-levelled Games
  Existence Results for Many Voters
 Bezalel Peleg, Peter Sudholter
 >>New Map
 TU Games
  Coalitional TU Games and Solutions
  Coalitional Games
  Some Families of Games
  Market Games
  Cost Allocation Games
  Simple Games
  Properties of Solutions
  Bargaining Sets
  The Prekernel, Kernel, and Nucleolus
  The Nucleolus and the Prenucleolus
  The Reduced Game Property
  Desirability, Equal Treatment, and the Prekernel
  An Axiomatization of the Prekernel
  Individual Rationality and the Kernel
  Reasonableness of the Prekernel and the Kernel
  The Prekernel of a Convex Game
  The Prekernel and Syndication
  The Core
  The Prenucleolus
  Geometric Properties of the e-Core, Kernel, and Prekernel
  Geometric Properties of the e-Core
  Some Properties of the Least-Core
  The Reasonable Set
  Geometric Characterizations of the Prekernel and Kernel
  A Method for Computing the Prenucleolus
  The Shapley Value
  Continuity Properties of Solutions
  Upper Hemicontinuity of Solutions
  Lower Hemicontinuity of Solutions
  Continuity of the Prenucleolus
  Dynamic Bargaining Procedures for the Kernel and the Bargaining Set
  Dynamic Systems for the Kernel and the Bargaining Set
  Stable Sets of the Kernel and the Bargaining Set
  Asymptotic Stability of the Nucleolus
 Bezalel Peleg, Peter Sudholter
 >>New Map
 NTU Games
  Cooperative Games in Strategic and Coalitional Form
  Cooperative Games in Strategic Form
  a- and b-Effectiveness
  Coalitional Games with Nontransferable Utility
  Cooperative Games with Side Payments but Without Transferable Utility
  The Core of NTU Games
  The Shapley NTU Value and the Harsanyi Solution
  The Shapley Value of NTU Games
  A Characterization of the Shapley NTU Value
  The Harsanyi Solution
  A Characterization of the Harsanyi Solution
  The Consistent Shapley Value
  For Hyperplane Games
  For p-Smooth Games
  Axiomatizations
  The Role of IIA
  Logical Independence
  On the Classical Bargaining Set and the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set for NTU Games
  Variants of the Davis-Maschler Bargaining Set for NTU Games
  The Ordinal Bargaining Set M
  A Proof of Billera's Theorem.
  Solutions Related to M
  The Ordinal Bargaining Sets
  Reactive
  Semi-Reactive
  Solutions Related to the Prekernel
 Bezalel Peleg, Peter Sudholter